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This article analyses how the ‘securitization’ of highly pathogenic avian
influenza (H5N1) contributed to the rise of a protracted international
virus-sharing dispute between developing and developed countries. As fear
about the threat of a possible human H5N1 pandemic spread across the world,
many governments scrambled to stockpile anti-viral medications and vaccines,
albeit in a context where there was insufficient global supply to meet such a
rapid surge in demand. Realizing that they were the likely ‘losers’ in this
international race, some developing countries began to openly question the
benefits of maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation,
especially the common practice of sharing national virus samples with the rest of
the international community. Given that such virus samples were also crucial to
the high-level pandemic preparedness efforts of the West, the Indonesian
government in particular felt emboldened to use international access to its H5N1
virus samples as a diplomatic ‘bargaining chip’ for negotiating better access to
vaccines and other benefits for developing countries. The securitized global
response to H5N1 thus ended up unexpectedly entangling the long-standing
international virus-sharing mechanism within a wider set of political disputes,
as well as prompting governments to subject existing virus-sharing arrange-
ments to much narrower calculations of national interest. In the years ahead,
those risks to international health cooperation must be balanced with the policy
attractions of the global health security agenda.
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KEY MESSAGES
 Indonesia’s decision in December 2006 to cease sharing its H5N1 virus samples with the international public health
community has prompted widespread consternation in the West, as well as eliciting considerable support from many
developing countries.
 The resulting international virus-sharing controversy has persisted for 4 years and has since become enmeshed in a
broader set of complex legal, political and economic issues that make the disagreement very difficult to resolve.
 The securitization of highly pathogenic avian flu contributed to the emergence of this international virus-sharing dispute,
showing that a securitized response to infectious disease management can also have downside risks in terms of
complicating international health cooperation.
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Amidst pressing international concern that the world was on
the cusp of a renewed human influenza pandemic, the
Indonesian government took the controversial decision in
December 2006 to cease sharing its H5N1 virus samples with
the international community. It did so after discovering that
the virus samples it had been forwarding freely to the World
Health Organization (WHO) through the long-standing Global
Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) were being passed on
to pharmaceutical companies in the West, where they were
being used to develop lucrative new vaccines. Indonesia pointed
out that this violated the WHO’s own guidelines according
to which virus samples should not be distributed outside of
the WHO network without prior consent of originating
countries (WHO 2005b: 2). Western pharmaceutical companies
subsequently also offered those novel vaccines back to the
Indonesian government at commercial rates, which Indonesian
authorities deemed unaffordable in light of the country’s large
population of more than 220 million people.
Indonesia’s decision to stop this ‘exploitative’ process by
withholding its virus samples split opinion within the interna-
tional community. Many governments and medical researchers
in the West expressed consternation and even anger at a
decision they claim is recklessly endangering international
public health and global health security. Yet Indonesia’s
position has also won considerable support, especially amongst
many developing countries who feel similarly unable to afford
vaccines at market rates. The resulting international dispute
over virus sharing has now lasted for 4 years, and marks one of
the most substantial setbacks in international health
cooperation of the past decade.
The precise causes of this virus-sharing controversy are
difficult to pin down, not least because both sides in the
dispute have engaged in a fair bit of diplomatic mud-slinging
regarding each other’s motives. At the time, the Indonesian
health minister Siti Fadilah Supari levied outlandish accus-
ations at the United States government, including that the
latter was ciphering off virus samples in order to develop
biological weapons at Las Alamos National Laboratories (Supari
2008: 19), a charge she reiterated in more general and country
non-specific terms as recently as March 2009 when she stated
publicly that ‘I’m truly afraid the world will use our viruses or
DNAs to create a mass biological weapon that may be used to
attack us’ (Jakarta Globe 2009). During that same period, some
policy-maker in the West similarly sought to tarnish the
reputation of the Indonesian health minister, with opinion
pieces written in influential newspapers and internet blogs
disparaging of her attempts to locate Indonesia’s health
policies within wider anti-Western struggles, and openly
speculating about more selfish or other political reasons for
her position on virus sharing (Holbrooke and Garrett 2008;
Leavitt 2008).
Nor was the decision to withhold virus samples from the
international public health community uncontroversial within
Indonesia itself. Certainly the position of the health minister
was endorsed at the time by the country’s president, and
throughout her term of office (which ended in 2009) Supari
remained a popular political figure frequently featured in
Indonesian lifestyle magazines. Yet dissenting voices within
Indonesia were also not difficult to find. Interviews carried out
with Indonesian officials by Paul Forster during 2008 revealed
that some thought she was mostly using the issue of virus
sharing as a way of deflecting attention from other political
failures. Others cited the wider popularity within Indonesian
politics of standing up to the West, and also noted that her line
would appeal to Islamist and nationalist parties. Others still
indicated that her motivation ultimately remained a mystery
and that there may also be other psychological factors involved
(Forster 2009: 47–49). Those interviewees further pointed to
tensions within the Indonesian Ministry of Health, where the
virus-sharing dispute was seen to be distracting from other
crucial items of business and complicating relations with the
WHO (Forster 2009: 48). The course of events leading up to the
international virus-sharing dispute is therefore complex, and is
also likely to include a range of factors associated with
Indonesian domestic politics. Even with the benefit of hind-
sight, the emergence of the international virus-sharing dispute
cannot be readily reduced to a single factor.
Yet one important aspect of that virus-sharing controversy
that analysts have so far overlooked is the contributing role
played by the initial ‘securitization’ of highly pathogenic avian
influenza. That securitized international response to H5N1 had
two fateful consequences. First, the considerable fear of an
imminent human pandemic provoked a competitive rush
amongst governments around the world (including Indonesia)
to secure access to pharmacological counter-measures for
reducing the spread of H5N1. In a global context where there
were insufficient global supplies to meet that sudden surge in
demand, it did not take long for some developing countries to
become acutely aware that a profound conflict of interest exists
between developed and developing countries when it comes to
maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation.
The international virus-sharing mechanism may work well
for developed countries that possess their own pharma-
ceutical manufacturing base, but the material benefits accruing
from such cooperation for developing countries are far less
evident.
Second, the high-level concern about H5N1 in the West
suddenly also rendered the viruses circulating in Indonesia’s
territorial borders very ‘valuable’. At the time the West needed
unencumbered and legal access to samples of those viruses in
order to track the global evolution of the virus and to develop
pharmacological treatments against the threat. Without such
access, the West would not be able to maintain a set of
comprehensive and up-to-date medical interventions to protect
their populations—even if they had the manufacturing capacity
to do so (unless Western countries were able to obtain
such samples through channels other than the GISN). Amidst
the occasionally frenzied efforts of the West to shore up its
defences against the impending H5N1 threat, and the political
pressure it consequently put on developing countries where
human cases of H5N1 infection were already occurring, the
Indonesian government in particular came to realize that it now
controlled access to what was in fact a very precious ‘re-
source’—and one which it, in turn, could deploy as a diplomatic
bargaining chip on the international stage for negotiating
greater access to vaccines and other benefits for developing
countries.
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Both effects of the securitization of H5N1 have ultimately
made the virus-sharing dispute more difficult to resolve: the
first has embroiled the long-standing international virus-
sharing mechanism in a much wider set of North–South
disputes, whilst the second has rendered international health
cooperation a matter of more narrow and calculated national
interest. A key lesson to emerge from the international virus-
sharing controversy is therefore that a securitized response to
infectious disease management can also have unanticipated
consequences in terms of further complicating international
health cooperation. In the years ahead, those downside risks
associated with a securitized response to global public health
will need to be balanced with the evident benefits of the global
health security agenda, especially in terms of mobilizing
political leadership and resources for the management of
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases.
Method
This article undertakes a case study analysis of the international
response to the emergence of human infections with highly
pathogenic avian influenza A viruses of the subtype H5N1
(hereafter simply H5N1). Specifically, the article analyses how
the securitized nature of that global response to H5N1
contributed in recent years to the rise of a protracted interna-
tional virus-sharing dispute between developed and developing
countries. The study draws upon securitization theory as its
conceptual framework, which was initially developed in the
non-medical disciplines of International Relations and Critical
Security Studies. Securitization theory is principally concerned
with discerning how issues are responded to differently in
national and international policy circles when they become
widely perceived or ‘framed’ as pressing existential threats.
Crucially, and as a constructivist social theory, securitization
theory does not try to establish whether any particular issue
‘really’ constitutes a security threat or not; instead it mostly
comes into play once an issue has already been securitized, and
forms a useful conceptual tool for studying the political
consequences of such a securitization process. Based on an
extensive analysis of a wide range of different international
issues that have become securitized over the past two decades,
securitization theory has been able to identify a set of policy
advantages and drawbacks that can accrue once issues are
securitized.
Taking an interdisciplinary approach and bringing securitiza-
tion theory to bear directly on the international response to
highly pathogenic avian influenza is useful in that H5N1 too
became widely perceived as constituting such a pressing
existential threat in international policy circles (especially
throughout 2005 and 2006). Indeed, H5N1 marks one of the
most prominent international health issues to have become
securitized over the past decade. H5N1 can thus serve as a
pertinent case study for tracing how the effects of securitization
unfold specifically in the field of global health. The following
study analyses those political consequences in relation to the
international virus-sharing dispute, and shows those effects to
be consistent with the wider trends witnessed in a range of
other securitization processes that have already occurred out-
side of the health sector.
The empirical material for this study on the international
politics of virus sharing was drawn from a variety of different
sources. Those sources include more than a dozen semi-
structured, one-to-one background interviews carried out with
key participants in the international virus-sharing dispute. The
article also took into account a range of policy papers,
background papers, working papers and articles on virus
sharing generated by international organizations, governments,
think tanks and newspapers (secondary data), as well as
scholarly articles and books published on the virus-sharing
controversy (tertiary data). Those sources were located through
library searches, scholarly databases in public health and
international relations, internet searches using a commercial
search and contacts in the international academic and policy
communities.
Results and discussion
The securitization of H5N1
What exactly does it mean to say that an issue has become
‘securitized’? Scholars of international politics succinctly define
securitization as the political process through which an issue is
‘presented as an existential threat requiring emergency meas-
ures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of
political procedure’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–24). The decisive
factor in identifying a securitization process is therefore not
whether the word ‘security’ is directly invoked, but rather
whether an issue is presented according to the aforementioned
logic of an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). Such
existential threats can be military in nature, as is frequently the
case when one state declares war on another. Yet such
securitization processes can also unfold in response to issues
that are essentially non-military in character. In fact one of the
most notable features of the international security agenda over
the past decade is the growing number of broader social issues
that have been discussed as pressing existential threats, ranging
from climate change and the ‘war’ on drugs, through to
migration and the progressive merging of security and devel-
opment in many parts of the world. As a rapidly evolving
literature now documents, infectious diseases have become the
latest in a long line of non-military issues to be securitized in
such a manner (Elbe 2006; McInnes and Lee 2006; Ingram
2007; Kelle 2007; Davies 2008; Fidler and Gostin 2008; Leboeuf
and Broughton 2008; Scoones and Forster 2008).
In the case of H5N1, the manifestations of that securitization
process are already too numerous to recount in full; but a few
examples will suffice to illustrate the point. Writing in the New
York Times in 2005, two senators from the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee warned their readers that we usually
think about national security threats in terms of nuclear
proliferation, rogue states and terrorism, but that ‘another
kind of threat lurks beyond our shores, one from nature, not
humans – an avian flu pandemic. An outbreak could cause
millions of deaths, destabilize Southeast Asia (its likely place of
origin), and threaten the security of governments around the
world’ (New York Times 2005). One of the two Senators
sounding that alarm was—at the time—a junior Democrat
from the state of Illinois, who had just been elected to Senate
the previous year, and who would later go on to become
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President of the United States of America, Barak Obama. In his
view, H5N1 was not just another infectious disease to be dealt
with by routine international public health measures, but a new
and grave global threat requiring a much more urgent policy
response. That same year, across the Atlantic, the Civil
Contingency Secretariat in the United Kingdom echoed that
avian flu is ‘as serious a threat as terrorism’ (Lean 2005).
In 2006 the National Security Strategy of the United States
(Office of the President of the United States 2006) then directly
acknowledged the threat posed by ‘public health challenges like
pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no
borders’. The 2006 World Economic Forum held in Davos,
Switzerland, similarly identified H5N1 as the primary threat
preoccupying global business and political leaders. Noting
limited supplies of anti-viral drugs, its report warned that in
the worst case scenario there could even be ‘rioting to gain
access to scarce supplies of anti-virals and vaccines; a collapse
of public order; partial de-urbanization as people flee popula-
tion centres; the extinction of trust in governments; decimation
of specific human skill sets; and forced, large-scale migration,
associated with the further collapse of already weak states’
(World Economic Forum 2006: 9). In retrospect, 2005 and 2006
thus emerge as the 2 years in which the securitization of
highly pathogenic avian influenza reached its highest level, in
terms of H5N1 being widely perceived as a pressing existential
threat demanding an urgent and sustained international
response.
That concern with the acute existential threat posed by H5N1
would continue well into 2007 and 2008, although there is
some evidence that the threat perception began to decline in
the course of 2008, and attention also rapidly shifted to the
emergence of influenza A (H1N1) in the spring of 2009 (World
Bank 2008). Yet in 2007 the WHO still referred to avian flu as
‘the most feared security threat’ (WHO 2007: 45), whilst in
2008 pandemic threats remained salient enough to be officially
incorporated into the United Kingdom’s National Security
Strategy, both because of their ability to directly affect the
country and because they could potentially undermine inter-
national stability (Cabinet Office 2008: 3). That same year the
World Bank warned in one of its reports that even though the
incidence of human cases of infection was declining in many
countries, ‘the virus remains a substantial threat to global
public health security’ (World Bank 2008: 10).
It is possible, then, to trace how highly pathogenic avian
influenza has become ‘securitized’ over the past 5 years. During
this time, H5N1 was elevated from a technical public health
issue that could be dealt with through the routine procedures of
public health institutions and scientific experts, to something
perceived as posing a much more existential threat to popula-
tions, economic systems and even political structures. The
international response to the threat of H5N1, in short, emerges
as a classic example of a securitization process, and that also
makes it an ideal case study for analysing the kinds of policy
advantages and drawbacks that accrue when issues become
securitized specifically in the field of global health.
Turning first to the policy advantages, the securitization of
H5N1 has undoubtedly raised political awareness about the
virus around the world, and has persuaded policy-makers to
formulate a range of pandemic preparedness plans. A survey
carried out by the United Nations System Influenza
Coordination Unit suggests that over 140 countries have now
developed national pandemic preparedness plans, although
their extent varies significantly between countries and many
of the plans still remain untested in practice (World Bank
2008: 52). The threat associated with H5N1 has also freed up
resources to address the issue, with US$2.7 billion having been
pledged globally (US$1.5 billion disbursed) for pandemic
preparedness efforts (World Bank 2008: 8). A 2008 World
Bank report thus found that ‘the threat posed over the
last 5 years has mobilized an unprecedented coming together
of the animal health, human health, disaster preparedness and
communication sectors to work in a cross discipline, cross
sector and cross boundary way’ (World Bank 2008: 8).
Moreover, such preparations were undoubtedly helpful in
making governments feel more prepared when dealing with
the outbreak of new human infections with influenza A
(H1N1) in the course of 2009. All of those developments also
confirm a core insight witnessed in relation to a range of other
securitization processes, namely that they can have policy
benefits in terms of mobilizing resources and garnering greater
political attention for important issues (Buzan et al. 1998: 29).
Those benefits notwithstanding, however, international ef-
forts to prepare the world for a possible human H5N1 pandemic
have also encountered at least one very significant setback
when the Indonesian government decided unexpectedly at the
end of 2006 that it would no longer share its H5N1 virus
samples with the rest of the international community. That
move threw a sizeable spanner into the global pandemic
preparedness machinery because Indonesia was, in many
ways, at the ‘forefront’ of a possible H5N1 pandemic, reporting
the highest numbers of human cases and deaths of H5N1
infection up to that point in time. Without access to the viruses
circulating within Indonesia’s territorial borders, it was no
longer possible for the international public health community
to acquire comprehensive surveillance data about how the virus
was evolving, nor to develop stockpiles of up-to-date candidate
vaccines based on the more virulent Indonesian virus strands.
With emotions running high on both sides, the stand-off
between the West and Indonesia (backed vocally by many other
developing countries such as Thailand, Brazil, India as well as
the Third World Network) has become known in the interna-
tional public health community as the ‘virus-sharing contro-
versy’. That dispute has now lasted for 4 years and, despite
some limited progress being made, fundamental disagreements
persist amongst the core parties in this dispute. As we shall see
below, the securitized response to H5N1 contributed to that
critical setback in international public health cooperation in
at least two ways, and in a manner that is consistent with the
wider effects of securitization processes previously witnessed in
other policy areas and sectors outside the domain of global
health.
The international scramble for anti-virals and
vaccines
One effect of securitization processes observed more generally
is that when issues become securitized, governments often
resort to emergency measures and engage in ‘extraordinary
defensive moves’ in order to meet that perceived threat
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(Buzan et al. 1998: 204). That was certainly the case in relation
to H5N1 as well. As bird flu came to be perceived as a pressing
global security threat, many governments around the world
embarked upon a frenzied race to acquire special medical
counter-measures to meet this impending threat.
In the case of H5N1 there are actually many different ways in
which governments could respond to a possible pandemic,
including a range of non-pharmacological interventions such as
isolation, quarantine and contact tracing, through to traveller
screening, and implementing social distancing measures that
minimize public gatherings by closing schools and cancelling
mass spectator events. In fact, when it comes to seasonal flu
many developing countries do not routinely resort to medical
countermeasures such as mass vaccination or prescribing
anti-virals—an understandable public health strategy in light
of competing budgetary pressures and a range of other health
issues that also need to be urgently addressed.
Yet given the perceived level of the H5N1 threat, most
governments rapidly concluded that confronting H5N1 required
more than just the usual public health responses to commu-
nicable diseases, not least because the considerable interna-
tional anxiety around H5N1 created immense domestic
pressures for governments to be seen to be taking the strongest
possible action to protect citizens against a pending pandemic.
Many governments decided that in the event of a pandemic
the best line of defence would be the extensive use of
pharmacological interventions like anti-virals and new vaccines.
Manufacturers of anti-virals like oseltamivir (brand name
Tamiflu) claim that the drug can be used both to treat those
infected with H5N1 (if taken within 48 hours of the onset of
symptoms) and as a prophylactic given to those who have been
in contact with people who have been infected. In addition to
anti-virals, a 2005 report by the WHO also observed that
‘vaccines are universally regarded as the most important
medical intervention for preventing influenza and reducing
its health consequences during a pandemic’ (WHO 2005a: 45).
Amongst the considerable anxiety that a human H5N1
pandemic was imminent, anti-virals and vaccines thus quickly
became seen as the ‘magic bullet’ or ‘gold standard’ for
countries to defend themselves against the looming threat.
Not surprisingly, the serious concern about the threat posed
by H5N1 ended up stimulating immense international
demand for those pharmacological products, not least because
many governments around the world felt that the only way
to adequately protect their populations was to take the
extraordinary step of pro-actively stockpiling those medicines
(especially anti-virals) to ensure availability of supplies for
rapid dispersal in the event of a pandemic materializing.
Yet from a global public health perspective that intense focus
on acquiring medical counter-measures also had one significant
drawback: there was insufficient international manufacturing
capacity to meet such a sudden surge in demand. As the 2005
WHO report went on to note, ‘the greatest problem is
inadequate production capacity. Demand will unquestionably
outstrip supply, particularly at the start of a pandemic’ (WHO
2005a: 46). Put differently, in the event of pandemic transmis-
sion of H5N1 there would inevitably be ‘winner’ and ‘loser’
populations. There would be those countries which would
benefit from the protection afforded by pharmacological
interventions (or at least do so before the majority of other
countries), and those that would have to settle for a more
‘low-tech’ approach probably associated with higher rates of
morbidity and mortality.
Who were the likely loser populations going to be? It was not
difficult for several developing countries to deduce that it was
likely to be them, as they were facing a double disadvantage.
First, manufacturing capacity—especially in terms of vaccines—
was geographically concentrated in developed countries
(Australia, Europe, Japan and North America) giving those
countries a distinct advantage in terms of securing access to
medicines for their populations (WHO 2005a: 47). Second,
under market conditions where demand outstrips supply, the
factor most likely to determine who would secure those
treatments would be price; and here too it would be difficult
for developing countries to compete with their wealthier
counterparts.
Such global inequalities are certainly not new. Many
developing countries have in fact long been aware of how the
market dynamics of supply and demand have frequently not
worked to their advantage in the area of public health. In many
cases such free market conditions also do not exist in the first
place, because the allocation of medical counter-measures are
often agreed between governments and commercial companies
through pre-purchase agreements long in advance of a
pandemic actually materializing. Moreover, related concerns
about global inequalities were already simmering amongst
developing countries amidst the extensive changes negotiated
to the International Health Regulations, the rise of new
international surveillance mechanisms (Calain 2007), as well
as the wider (and controversial) discussions about global health
security (Aldis 2008: 373–4). Yet as the world was confronted
with the spectre of an impending H5N1 pandemic, those
inequalities crystallized in quite a stark manner, and in a way
that could not be easily ignored by anyone who cared to take a
closer look. If a pandemic was coming, there would be huge
disparities in the medical defences available to countries around
the world.
The realization of that profound inequality provoked deep
frustrations about existing forms of global health governance.
In fact, some developing countries were so dismayed at the
possibility of having to confront an imminent pandemic
without access to such medical interventions that they began
to openly question the value of maintaining existing forms of
international health cooperation which appeared to be mostly
benefitting developed countries. Those developing country
frustrations feature particularly prominently in the account of
the virus-sharing dispute advanced by the Indonesian Health
Minister Siti Supari in her book It’s Time for the World to Change
in which she describes her experiences and views on the
international virus-sharing dispute (Supari 2008). Although the
English translation of the book was officially withdrawn by her
in February 2008 (due to what she claims were inaccuracies in
the translation), the book nonetheless provides a useful insight
into her overall reasoning and decision-making.1
In the book Supari recounts an early but formative encounter
with this scarcity problem specifically in relation to anti-virals.
When in 2005 she was finally able to find some resources from
other government budgets to purchase Tamiflu for treating
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early human cases of H5N1 infection that had emerged in
Indonesia, she claims that she could not obtain supplies
because the medicine was being pre-emptively stockpiled by
Western countries, which at that point did not even have any
human cases of infection with H5N1. She was concerned that it
may have proved impossible for Indonesia to acquire the
medicines at that time, had it not been for the willingness of
Australia and Thailand to share their supplies with Indonesia
(Supari 2008: 5–6).
That episode occurred early on in the securitization of H5N1,
and the international production of Tamiflu has expanded
considerably since that time, including production in generic
form. Nevertheless, that early experience with the limited
availability of Tamiflu clearly left a lasting impression on
Supari, especially in relation to the eventual development of a
vaccine, for which production capabilities would initially
remain similarly insufficient to meet demand:
‘‘The incident of the sweeping out of the Tamiflu stock by
developed countries that had no cases of the disease was
[sic] really made a deep wound in my heart. . . . Just imagine
that when human pandemic of avian flu strikes developing
or even poor countries and than [sic] because of the
scarceness of the medicine they have to witness their people
die. A thought flashed into my mind. Whenever they find
vaccine for human pandemic of avian flu, I was certain
that the rich countries with lots of money will be the
first priority, even though the materials of the vaccines,
i.e. the viruses come from the affected countries.’’ (Supari
2008: 5–6)
That fear would become partially realized in 2006
when she was informed by a journalist from the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation that an Australian company was
trying to develop a vaccine on the basis of the Indonesian strain
that it had shared with the international community through
the GISN.
This problem of the uneven international distribution of
medical countermeasures also continues today in relation to
accessing H5N1 vaccines. A report released in March 2009
by the international management consulting firm Oliver
Wyman, which was commissioned by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, estimates that the most likely scenario in the
event of a H5N1 pandemic would be an international produc-
tion capacity of 2.5 billion doses of pandemic vaccine in the
first 12 months (after the production strain is received),
which would still require 4 years to meet global demand
(Oliver Wyman 2009). New developments in cell-based
vaccines may change that overall equation in coming years,
but that is still some time off. Moreover, and as also
became clear in relation to H1N1 in 2009, because vaccines
usually need to be virus specific, developed countries too would
have to wait several months before the first mass-produced
vaccines became available. Nevertheless, those inequalities
remain an important and enduring feature of global health
governance, much to the dissatisfaction of many developing
countries.
So frustrated and disillusioned was the Indonesian govern-
ment in particular, that it took the controversial decision in
December 2006 to withdraw from the mechanism by ceasing to
share its H5N1 virus samples with the international community
unless the viruses were formally recognized as Indonesian (by
signing a formal Material Transfer Agreement), and until
greater access to vaccines and other benefits derived from the
virus-sharing mechanism were secured for developing coun-
tries. As Siti Supari put it in a March 2007 speech at the High
Level Meeting on Responsible Practices for Sharing Avian
Influenza Viruses and Resulting Benefits, ‘it is time to change
the mechanism of the GISN because it is not in favour of the
avian flu affected countries’ (Supari 2008: 52). Indonesia, in
other words, would no longer cooperate with the long-standing
virus-sharing mechanisms unless the concerns of developing
countries about access to vaccines and other benefits were
systematically addressed first. That crucial decision effectively
triggered the international virus-sharing dispute.
With the benefit of hindsight, then, it is possible to trace how
the securitized response to H5N1 provoked a chain of events
that would end up putting substantial new pressure on existing
forms of international public health cooperation. The immense
fear surrounding H5N1 compelled governments around the
world to protect their populations by undertaking emergency
defensive measures like seeking stockpiles of anti-virals and
new vaccines. Yet because there is insufficient supply capacity
at international level for meeting this demand, that proved
very difficult for developing countries to achieve. The latter
quite understandably became disillusioned with the merits
of maintaining existing forms of public health cooperation
like the international virus-sharing mechanism and began
openly questioning its legitimacy. From their perspective,
those forms of international health cooperation may work
well for developed countries that possess their own pharma-
ceutical manufacturing base, but the material benefits accruing
from such cooperation for developing countries are far less
evident.
All of this also fundamentally changed the prospects of
continuing international health cooperation between developed
and developing countries. Whereas hitherto the international
virus-sharing mechanism was largely seen as a routine system
of functional public health cooperation between countries
around the world, its operation now became a heavily
politicized North–South issue that eventually also attracted
the support of the 112 member strong Non-Aligned Movement
(in May 2008). By this point in time the international
virus-sharing mechanism was no longer just a technical or
functional issue between Indonesia and the WHO, but a
political contest between developed and developing countries.
After operating for more than half a century, the GISN now
faced one of its most significant political challenges to date
(Brammer et al. 2007: 254–55). That is one significant vector
though which the securitized global response to H5N1 has
unexpectedly ended up politically complicating an important
and long-standing mechanism of international health
cooperation.
Turning lethal viruses into diplomatic
bargaining chips
A second effect frequently associated with securitization
processes is that they also tend to encourage greater and
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more high-level state involvement in the handling of an issue
(Buzan et al. 1998: 29). That is because of the historical role of
the state in terms of being the main provider of security, and
the view that providing that security is also one on if its core
duties. As issues become securitized they thus tend to attract
much closer and high-level attention from governments.
Evidence of this wider tendency can similarly be found at
play in the case of H5N1. However, in the latter case that
high-level state involvement too ended up further complicating
international health cooperation as some states suddenly began
to subject the international virus-sharing mechanism to much
narrower calculations of national interest, and even attempted
to use virus samples as diplomatic bargaining chips for
pursuing their national interest.
The Indonesian government in particular recognized that
the securitized international response to H5N1, with all of its
frenzied pandemic preparedness activities, also offered positive
political opportunities for exploiting the virus-sharing mech-
anism in the pursuit of the country’s national interest. The
Indonesian government knew at least three things. First, all the
high-level attention on H5N1 made it clear to the government
how pressing a political concern H5N1 was in the West, and
how much political pressure there was to protect populations
against this threat. In the United States, for example, the
growing concern about the threat posed by H5N1 had even led
to the extraordinary creation of a new high-level position
within the US State Department—the Special Representative on
Avian and Pandemic Influenza. Protecting their populations
against a possible H5N1 pandemic was evidently one of
the top political priorities of many Western governments at
the time.
Secondly, because Western countries initially had no
human cases of H5N1 infection occurring within their own
territories, they could only make the vaccines necessary to
protect their populations by getting access to wild viruses from
other countries, such as Indonesia, where human infections
were already occurring (Supari 2008: 10). Without legal and
open access to these virus samples, Western governments
would struggle to maintain up-to-date surveillance and medical
interventions for H5N1 (unless they obtained virus samples
by other means). Virus samples were thus a crucial ‘resource’
for Western governments as they scrambled to protect
their populations against the prospect of an imminent
pandemic.
Thirdly, because it was eventually confirmed that the
Indonesian virus strand was more virulent than other strands,
a vaccine based on the Indonesian strand would be the most
desirable in terms of offering protection (Supari 2008: 25–27).
Describing her realization that the Indonesian virus was distinct
and more virulent (and thus of immense interest to those
tracking the evolution of the virus and making vaccines),
Supari actually felt ‘happy’ because for Indonesia that now
meant ‘bargaining power!’ (Supari 2008: 27). Supari, in other
words, realized at this crucial moment that access to
Indonesian virus samples could form new diplomatic leverage
for the Indonesian government in its attempts to secure greater
access to medical countermeasures for Indonesia. The
Indonesian health minister described her thinking in the fol-
lowing, candid terms: ‘I had to change the paradigm.
How? I had nothing. My country is not a superpower. I am
only a Health Minister with 240 million people to serve. . . I had
to do something. . . the main variable. . . is the wild virus. So I
had to stop the virus sharing with the WHO-CC [World Health
Organization Collaborating Centers]’ (Supari 2008: 163). As
Indonesia began to assert its ‘viral sovereignty’ over H5N1
viruses circulating in its territory, those viruses now became
transformed from mere biological materials to key political
‘bargaining chips’ in the diplomatic arsenal of the Indonesian
state, which it would use to further its own national interest
on the international stage.
Going down this path was a high-risk strategy, of course,
in that this would only work as long as the Indonesian
government could actually maintain tight control over the
viruses circulating in its territories, and prevent outside
countries from obtaining virus samples from Indonesia through
other channels. Presumably this is part of the reason why the
Indonesian health minister later also expressed her desire to
evict the US Naval Laboratory (NAMRU-2) from the country,
which she suspected at the time as being a back channel for
virus samples leaving her country. NAMRU-2 has since been
closed down and has been replaced by a new civilian facility. It
is probably also for that same reason that before leaving office,
Supari further instructed laboratories and researchers in
Indonesia not to accept foreign donations any more, as she
feared that those funding streams could be accompanied by
other demands from foreign donors. Although the future status
of a military facility by a foreign country, or indeed foreign aid,
is not something which would not normally be seen to fall
within the portfolio or remit of a health minister, these are
issues she began to take a very keen interest in, presumably
because if viruses were to be transferred out of the country
through military facility or other links, that would seriously—
and perhaps fatally—undermine her bargaining position on
virus sharing.
Yet armed with those new ‘bargaining chips’, Supari also
felt sufficiently emboldened to hold out for more than just
a few concessions made by the West, and to push for a
fundamental transformation of the virus-sharing mechanism.
When, for example, she was approached by the WHO with
offers of a laboratory upgrade and as much vaccine as they
needed in February 2007, she turned those offers down. The
reason she cites for this decision is that she did not want
Indonesia to be dependent upon the charity of other countries,
insisting that ‘by recognizing our right over the viruses, we can
obtain whatever we need respectfully, because we own some-
thing precious to give’ (Supari 2008: 41).
Rather than simply accepting those offers of material support,
and resolving the dispute there and then, the Indonesian health
minister instead formulated a much stronger demand that
made Indonesia’s resumption of virus sharing conditional upon
a more fundamental reformation of the whole virus-sharing
mechanism. Her underlying position, which she subsequently
advanced at the intergovernmental meeting in November 2007,
became: ‘Number One: Virus sharing is a sovereign right of a
country and not to be compromised. Number Two: Benefits
sharing is a consequence of virus sharing, which instead of a
charity from the developed country to the country where
the virus originated, it is the right of the latter’ (Supari 2008:
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116–7). Today the negotiations around virus sharing are
therefore no longer simply about re-integrating Indonesia into
the GISN, but have now become about fundamentally trans-
forming that entire virus-sharing mechanism. Moreover, even
though Supari is no longer in office, her position continues to
be defended by Indonesian officials, as can be seen by the more
recent assertion of a member of the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle that ‘Jakarta should not succumb to pressure
from the West. I agree with the position of our former health
minister [Siti Supari] who has been firmly defending our
national interest’ (Budianto 2010).
In the end, Supari’s stronger demand for fundamental
transformation of the system may bring future benefits for
developing countries. Already the WHO has taken some steps to
accommodate the demands of Indonesia and other developing
countries, including the development of a system for tracking
the movement of shared H5N1 virus samples, and exploring the
feasibility of creating a stockpile of vaccines that developing
countries could draw on. However, the core demand for a more
fundamental transformation of the international virus-sharing
mechanism has not been achieved to date. That is because
developed countries are currently not prepared to agree to such
a fundamental transformation, which—in turn—would not be
in their national interest.
Indeed, countries like the United States are very hesitant to
agree to a deeper reform of a system that has been operating
(in their view very successfully) for more than half a decade.
As former US Secretary of Health and Human Services, Mike
Leavitt, indicated in his blog from 14 April 2008, he thought
Indonesia was ultimately working on a principal of ‘share
samples, get paid’ (Leavitt 2008). That may seem like a terse
formulation, but it is the underlying principle of whether
benefits sharing should be formally tied to virus sharing
that now divides both sides and that now makes progress so
difficult to achieve. From the perspective of the United States
virus sharing should not be linked to benefit sharing in a
formal way. Leavitt did acknowledge at the time that ‘the issues
of the availability of vaccines and the sharing of samples
are both legitimate ones, and we must deal with them both,
but we should not link. World health should not be the subject
of barter’ (Leavitt 2008). In his view such formal linking
would ‘begin to erode our ability to make vaccines at all,
because once the practice of free and open sharing of viruses
stops, the slope is slippery, and there will be no end to
the demands’ (Leavitt 2008). Yet it should not go amiss that
this position also favours the national interest of the United
States, in that it would be the best system for ensuring
that Western countries continue to have unfettered access to
samples of new viruses irrespective of where on the planet they
first emerge.
In either case, the United States government will no doubt
be encouraged by the fact that other developing countries have
not followed Indonesia’s more drastic step of ceasing to share
virus samples (though vocally supporting Indonesia). It will
have further noted that the more recent concern about an
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic did not spark any additional
attempts to withhold virus samples. The United States govern-
ment thus continues to make the promotion of global health
security one of its key objectives in meeting biological threats
(National Security Council 2009), with the result that a
deep diplomatic gulf thus remains between the core parties
in the dispute. Indeed, today the issue of virus and benefit
sharing is still unresolved, with diverging views on several
core issues, and remains subject to further discussion
in an open-ended working group (World Health Assembly
2010).
Here too, then, it is possible in retrospect to trace how the
securitized response to H5N1 eventually began to put new
pressures on the international virus-sharing mechanism and
international health cooperation. As a result of the much closer
and high-level governmental attention on H5N1, the entire
issue of virus sharing suddenly and unexpectedly became
subject to much more narrow calculations of state interest. The
Indonesian government in particular realized that it was in the
United States’ national interest to secure and maintain access
to these samples, and Indonesia in turn could use the granting
of access to these samples as a way of furthering its own
national interest of achieving greater benefits from sharing its
viruses. Whilst that strategy may bring advantages to develop-
ing countries in the long run (which still remains to be seen),
the push for a more fundamental transformation of the
virus-sharing system has also raised the political stakes in the
dispute further still, and ultimately culminates in a more
difficult stand-off between the supporters of the GISN mech-
anism and those states like Indonesia pushing for fundamental
reform. In that process the entire virus-sharing mechanism
became transformed from a largely low-level, habitual and
routine system of functional public health cooperation, to
something that was subject to much narrower considerations of
state interests, and would effectively become a bargaining chip
in high-level diplomatic negotiations between states pursuing
competing national interests. This too forms an important
vector through which international health cooperation has, in
the end, been complicated by the securitized international
response to H5N1.
Conclusion
What wider lessons about the securitization of infectious
diseases can be drawn from the case of H5N1? Those lessons
need to be teased out with considerable care. Not only is it very
difficult to generalize from a single case study, but we have also
already noted that there are undoubtedly a variety of different
factors involved in the emergence of the international virus-
sharing dispute, including factors particular to Indonesian
politics. It is also noteworthy that besides Indonesia, no other
country (including those vocally supporting the Indonesian
position) has undertaken a similar, formal refusal to share virus
samples. Nor, for that matter, has such a refusal manifested
itself in the more recent case of the influenza A (H1N1)
pandemic.
That said, there is a wider and important lesson that can
be learned from the virus sharing episode. Scholars of securi-
tization processes usefully remind us that ‘one has to weigh the
always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of
security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and
mobilization’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). In the case of H5N1 we
have seen there were certainly benefits to a securitized response
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to global health that can be discerned, especially in terms of
resources and political mobilization. However, in many ways
the more important lesson to emerge from the ongoing
international virus-sharing dispute, and one that has still not
been sufficiently appreciated in international policy circles, is
that there can also be unanticipated downside risks associated
with responding to health issues in a securitized mode. In the
case of H5N1, the securitized international response has also
had a range of less salient effects in terms of entangling
the long-standing virus-sharing mechanism in a wider set
of non-technical and non-medical disputes in international
politics. Indeed, the securitized response to H5N1 ended up
inadvertently provoking an intense re-politicization of interna-
tional virus sharing where the latter is no longer seen to be of
mutual benefit, but as a bargaining chip used by countries
like Indonesia to fundamentally reform the virus-sharing
mechanism.
None of the foregoing analysis is to imply that things
inevitably had to turn out this way, or to detract from the
responsibilities of the key parties involved in the dispute. Nor
is it to deny that the prospect of a future H5N1 pandemic
associated with high human mortality and morbidity was in-
deed a very disquieting prospect. Yet as an important instance
in which a health issue did become prominently securitized in
international policy circles, the case of H5N1 does demonstrate
very clearly that a securitized response to infectious diseases
can also structure global health debates in ways that are not
conducive to achieving higher levels of international health
cooperation. That is an important insight and cautionary note
worth retaining for the future when it comes to dealing with
emerging infectious diseases. After all, one of the most salient
features of global health over the past decade has been precisely
the tendency by many policy makers to try to deliberately shift
global health from the mould of ‘low’ politics, and to make
global health a more pressing concern of ‘high’ politics, by
actively seeking the securitization of health through the agenda
on global health security.
Funding
The research conducted for this article was supported by a grant
from the British Academy on Health Security (BARDA-47928).
Endnote
1 I would like to thank Paul Forster from the STEPS Centre in the
Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex for his
assistance in locating a copy of this book.
References
Brammer L, Postema A, Cox N. 2007. Seasonal and pandemic influenze
surveillance. In: M’ikanata M, Lynfield R, van Beneden C,
de Valk H (eds). Infectious Disease Surveillance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Budianto L. 2010. RI pushes for fair virus sharing scheme despite
Obama visit. Jakarta Post. 10 February.
Buzan B, Wæver O, de Wilde J. 1998. Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Cabinet Office. 2008. The National Security Strategy of the
United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World. London:
Cabinet Office.
Calain P. 2007. From the field side of the binoculars: a different view on
global public health surveillance. Health Policy and Planning 22:
13–20.
Davies S. 2008. Securitizing infectious disease. International Affairs 84:
295–313.
Fidler D, Gostin L. 2008. Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons,
Public Health and the Rule of Law. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Forster P. 2009. The Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Indonesia.
STEPS Working Paper 17. Brighton: STEPS Centre.
Holbrooke R, Garrett L. 2008. ‘Sovereignty’ that risks global health.
Washington Post. 10 April.
Ingram A. 2007. HIV/AIDS, security and the geopolitics of US-Nigerian
relations. Review of International Political Economy 14: 510–34.
Jakarta Globe. 2009. Minister wary of foreign ‘Attack’. Jakarta Globe. 21
May.
Kelle A. 2007. Securitization of international public health: implications
for global health governance and the biological weapons prohib-
ition regime. Global Governance 13: 217–35.
Lange JE. 2007. Pandemic flu: towards an effective global preparedness
policy. Remarks at Chatham House, London, United Kingdom,
October 17.
Lean G. 2005. Bird flu ‘as grave a threat as terrorism’. The Independent. 26
June. Online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/bird-
flu-as-grave-a-threat-as-terrorism-496608.html.
Leavitt M. 2008. Indonesia. Entry into Secretary Mike Leavitt’s
Pandemic Influenza Blog, 14 April. Online at: http://archive.hhs
.gov/secretarysblog/my_weblog/pandemic_planning/index.html.
Leboeuf A, Broughton E. 2008. Securitization of health and environ-
mental issues: process and effects. A research outline. Working
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